Many acquisitions by private equity (PE) firms are conducted by "clubs," where a number of PE firms join together to submit a single bid. We present a novel analysis of the economics of club bidding by private equity firms based on the notion that club formation may create value at the target firm by allowing the different dimensions of value creation of each individual PE firm to be aggregated by the club. We show that, when bidding is costly and bidder entry thus endogenous, club formation will generally reduce the premium target shareholders obtain from an acquisition.
Introduction
Private equity (PE) firms have become significant players in the market for mergers and acquisitions.
Over the last few years leading up to the market turmoil of 2008, these firms raised large amounts of capital from investors: for instance, the top 50 PE firms (as ranked in 2008) had raised about $800 billion in the time period from January 2003 to May 2008. 1 Given that private equity firms often undertake highly leveraged transactions, this translates into the ability to enter into deals worth somewhere in the range of $3 to $4 trillion dollars.
At the same time, there has been a growing tendency for private equity firms to form "clubs" and submit bids for target firms in conjunction with other PE firms. 2 In fact, the incidence of club bidding has been sufficiently widespread as to attract the attention of the U.S. Department of Justice, expressing concern that such "bidding rings" may reduce competition in the market for corporate control and therefore harm target shareholders (see Bailey, 2007 for a discussion). The argument is simple: when a club is formed, all things equal there are fewer bidders left who can make offers. Therefore, there is less competition for the target firm, leading to lower bid prices and reduced (target) shareholder value.
This heuristic, however, assumes that nothing changes as a result of the club's formation, so that the only impact is through a reduction in competition. We argue that, particularly for the case of private equity, a club may be formed as a way of exploiting complementary skills and synergies that can be used to create value at the target firm. Joining two (or more) PE firms for the purpose of submitting a bid and acquiring the target may allow for both firms' skills to be used, to the extent that each PE firm may have different expertise that can be used to create value. Indeed, this "value creation" is one of the motivations for clubbing most often cited by practitioners and industry experts. For example, " 'Good' club deals will be those formed in order to enhance competition, provide additional buyers, and take advantage of any number of firm-specific benefits that are compounded when private equity firms bid as a team. The value creation effect derived from the formation of a PE firm bidding club can offset the possible reduction in competition and lead to increased rather than decreased target shareholder value. The goal of this paper is to study the effect of club formation on the target firm's expected revenue, the club's expected profit, and the impact on the remaining non-club bidders.
To study these issues, we present a model that incorporates two main features. First, when a club is formed the value of each bidder in the club is aggregated, at least partly, into the club's value for the target. In other words, we allow for value creation as a result of the club's formation.
Second, we assume that there is a limited number of bidders who might benefit from acquiring the target. This would be the case if, for instance, value creation depends on synergies that are in limited supply, or if bidders face financial constraints that limit the number of firms that can participate, or if there are costs to bidding. While this second feature is likely relevant in many takeover contexts, the first is particularly applicable in the context of private equity, where each firm's "private value" from the acquisition is derived from the specific way in which it is able to increase value at the target. As long as the PE firms do not have perfectly overlapping sets of expertise, forming a club should allow for each firm's skill to be used at least to some extent.
This simple setup delivers a number of interesting results. While a club's formation always benefits the members of the club through a higher value for the target, it reduces the expected profits of the firms not part of the club -the independent bidders. This occurs because a club's higher value, which stochastically dominates that of an independent bidder, leads each independent bidder to have a lower probability of having its offer for the target accepted. Moreover, even when its offer is accepted, an independent bidder anticipates having to pay a higher price on average when one of its competitors is a club. The net effect is that independent bidders' profits are lower in the presence of a club, leading fewer of them to enter relative to the case where no club forms.
In essence, the club's higher value for the target introduces a wedge between the number of bidders in the club case versus the non-club case.
The asymmetry in the number of bidders across the two cases has important implications for shareholders at the target firm. We show that, under free entry, a club's formation is always bad for target shareholders. Despite the value creation of the club, the wedge in the number of bidders across the two cases is sufficiently large that competition is hampered excessively in the presence of a club, and target shareholders always receive a lower expected price for their firm when a club forms.
While a club's formation always negatively affects target shareholders when the number of bidders is endogenous, satisfaction of the free entry condition may require a very large number of PE firms that are able to bid when the costs of entry are very low. The practical reality, however, is that the number of PE firms that are in a position to bid for a target may be limited by factors such as whether a sufficient number of firms possess expertise in an industry or a specific segment of the market, rather than purely by the direct costs of bidding. Similarly, the total number of potential bidders may be bounded as a result of financial constraints that prevent some firms for bidding for any particular target, and this limit may often be reached long before the free entry condition becomes binding.
We therefore study the case where the cost of bidding is negligible, but where there is a limited number of PE firms that can actually benefit from the acquisition of the target. We show that when there is a small number of potential bidders, allowing a club to form is bad for the target shareholders. This occurs because a further reduction in the number of bidders when there is already not much competition has a large (and negative) impact on the expected value of the winning bid. This result therefore complements the finding for the case where the number of bidders is endogenous. However, as the number of potential bidders increases, the value creation effect associated with the club begins to dominate, and the seller is better off since he captures at least some of this value creation. We also show that the profitability of the club relative to non-club firms is increasing in the number of bidders, suggesting that the incentives to form a club may become even stronger as competition increases.
Whether target shareholders in the end benefit from the formation of a club therefore depends on how much costly it is to bid, how much value the club creates, and how competitive the private equity market is in this sense of how many firms could realistically bid for a target. We show that when bidding costs are high, a club's formation is unambiguously bad since the number of bidders will also necessarily be low, and will be yet lower in the presence of a club than in its absence. By contrast, when bidding costs are low, a club's formation may be beneficial to the target's shareholders when there are a large number of potential bidders for the target. This latter prediction distinguishes our framework from a pure collusive one where the main effect of forming a club is to reduce competition. Here, the private equity club's value creation can translate into gains for the target shareholders despite the reduction in competition. 3 Interestingly, our results also show that increasing the number of potential bidders may in fact make a club's formation less attractive to the target firm to the extent that firms' willingness to bid starts to become dictated by the need to cover their costs of bidding. At some point, no matter how many PE firms are available to bid, only a subset of them will find it optimal to do so under free entry.
It is worthwhile noting that in our analysis we abstract from other reasons for why club deals may be used. For instance, club deals may arise if they enable several private equity firms, none of whom may have the financial resources to acquire the target alone, to bid by joining their financial strength. Similarly, club deals may enable the PE firms to spread risks and allow them to contemplate acquisitions that would otherwise not be possible, or to share information, thus reducing the overall risk associated with the deal and allowing firms that might not otherwise participate to bid. 4 All of these rationales for club bidding should increase rather than decrease the number of bidders. Information pooling is yet another motivation for bidding clubs to form.
Information pooling improves the precision of bidder information but, similar to our model, reduces the potential number of bidders. 5 Our point is not, of course, to suggest that such rationales may not be important, but rather to examine the effect of a factor, value creation, that has been identified as particularly important for private equity acquisitions.
A related strand of literature in the economics of auctions has focused on the effect of collusive bidding, or on the opportunities for collusion derived from club bidding or "bidding rings." Much 3 This is very different from models of joint bidding in auctions where the formation of a club can enhance competition by allowing for bidders would otherwise not enter to participate. This could be the case, for instance, if bidders are financially constrained and the club allows them to pool resources (see, e.g., Hendricks and Porter (1992) for evidence in the context of auctions by the federal government for offshore leases). Here, competition is unambiguously reduced, yet the value creation by the club partly offsets the competition effect.
4 Many of these issues have been highlighted in the financial press as possible motivations for club bidding. See, e.g., SJ Berwin, 5/3/2008, AltAssets.
5 DeBrock and Smith (1983) use simulation analysis to show that the seller might benefit from bidder information sharing as long as the reduction in competition is not too severe. In a more recent paper, Mares and Shor (2008) show that if the total level of information in the market is kept constant then joint bidding increases bids due to information pooling. However, the reduction in competition effect always dominates. This reduction is in spite of the effect of the increase in bids in common value auctions due to a reduction in the number of active bidders (see, for example Bulow and Klemperer (2002) and Pinkse and Tan (2005) ).
of this literature focuses on whether as a result of collusive bidding the auction is likely to be efficient, in the sense of allocating the good to the bidder with the highest value. 6 Empirical work on this issue has focused on bidding in a common value context (e.g., FCC spectrum auctions, or off shore oil tracts). 7 Recently a few authors have taken bidder collusion to be value reducing for the seller and have developed normative models that design collusion-proof auction rules (see, Che and Kim (2008) and Pavlov (2008) ). To the best of our knowledge, none of this literature focuses on the main characteristic we use to distinguish takeovers by private equity clubs from other types of acquisitions, which is the ability to create value by aggregating each firm's synergy into one joint value for the club.
There are some recent empirical studies of the competitive effects of club bidding in private equity. The evidence on this issue is, however, mixed. Boone and Mulherin (2009) analyze measures of takeover competition such as the number of bidders making offers or the number of bidders receiving confidential information and conclude that there is not much evidence of anticompetitive behavior associated with the presence of a club. They obtain similar evidence when they perform a more traditional "event study" analysis to focus on bidder returns. By contrast, Officer et al. (2008) study bidding behavior primarily in the context of clubs formed by more prominent, larger private equity firms. In this context, they find evidence that club bidding depresses prices and leads to lower gains for target shareholders.
From a theoretical standpoint, reconciling these two sets of findings poses a challenge. One insight offered by our analysis is that some of the differences in target returns across the two samples may be explained not by focusing on cross-sectional differences in the targets, but rather by differences in the acquirers, i.e., the clubs. Our results suggest that club bidding will be beneficial for the seller when there is sufficient competition and when the club is highly efficient. As discussed above, what "sufficiently competitive" means needs to be judged relative to the costs of bidding, since situations with low bidding costs are likely to be characterized by many bidders and yet still have a club be detrimental to the target. Concerning club efficiency, while somewhat outside 6 For example, McAfee and McMillan (1992) derive a mechanism for information revelation amongst cartel members and show that efficiency in a sealed-bid first price auction is possible if bidding rings form a 'strong' cartel, i.e., allow for side payments. In a similar vein, Graham and Marshall (1987) show that an outside agent can use a knockout auction to ensure efficiency in a second price auction. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) extend the efficiency result to second price auctions with heterogenous bidders. Also see Athey and Bagwell (2001) for an application to a product market setting.
7 See Moody Jr and Kruvant (1988) and Hendricks and Porter (1992) .
our model, we conjecture that more prominent PE firms are likely to have more established (and therefore rigid) corporate cultures that may clash with potential partners, thus leading to less value creation. Moreover, the degree of overlap in expertise between two large PE firms is likely to be larger than for two smaller firms, each of which may be more highly specialized so that the club may be better at aggregating their separate values. However, a formal test of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the basic model, and in Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium for both the club and the non-club cases. In Section 5 we study the case where the number of bidders is exogenously fixed. In Section 4 we contrast these results to those obtained when the number of bidders is endogenous, being determined by a free entry condition for the PE firms. In Section 6 we combine these results to derive empirical predictions.
Section 7 concludes.
Model
Suppose there are an unbounded number of independent private equity (PE) firms with the ability to bid for the target under consideration. Each PE firm has a value for a target firm that is drawn from a uniform distribution:
Two of these PE firms, indexed by 1 and 2, are special in that, if allowed, they have the potential to merge before the start of bidding. Without loss of generality we refer to all bidders indexed by 3 or higher as independent bidders. Initially bidders do not know their own value for the target, but learn it before submitting their bids. This captures the fact that a potential acquiring firm may have to do some due diligence in order to identify ways in which value at the target can be improved, with representing how much value added they can provide, or the value of any synergies with the target firm. Therefore, the value may also be specific to the target firm and need not represent an intrinsic property of the bidder.
Assume now that there is a cost to each private equity firm of preparing and submitting a bid.
Such costs can arise, for instance, if it is costly to put together a bid or if there is a cost associated with due diligence or with an SEC filing fee. Likewise, they can arise if the private equity bidder itself bears a cost associated with identifying a good target for an acquisition since it must identify inefficiencies within the target firm as well as ways in which it can add value. The cost of bidding might also include direct costs like putting together a legal team and arranging financing, as well as indirect opportunity costs. This cost must be paid ex ante, that is, before the bidder knows his own value. This assumption allows us to calculate the free-entry number of bidders by focusing on each bidder's ex ante profits.
We consider two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that bidders all learn their private valuations and then all simultaneously submit bid for the target firm. In other words, the firm is auctioned off to the highest bidder. The highest bidder then pays the price bid by the second highest bidder (i.e., it is a second-price auction). The cost of entry, , will determine the number of bidders that choose to enter.
The second scenario is similar to the first in terms of the timing for the bidding, but we first allow two of the PE firms to merge into a "bidding ring" or a "club" and then bid against the participating independent bidders. Merging means that the value of the bidding ring is an aggregate of the two individual bidders' values. Specifically, bidders 1 and 2 merge into one "club bidder," , and this Once bidder is formed, all bidders -the club as well as all independent bidders -simultaneously submit bids. As before, the winner pays the price bid by the second highest bidder.
Preliminary analysis
We begin our analysis with a characterization of the revenue to the target firm and expected bidder profits under the two scenarios, no club and club, as a function of the number of bidders. In order to ensure consistency in our comparisons across the two cases, we denote by the "base" number of independent bidders for either the club or the no club cases. This means that, in the club case, there are a total of + 1 bidders: 1 club and independent bidders. In the no club case, we define the total number of bidders as + 2. Since the results related to scenario 1 with + 2 symmetric bidders are fairly standard (see, e.g., Krishna (2002)), we primarily focus on deriving the results for scenario 2, where bidders are asymmetric. For completeness, it is useful to first summarize the known results for the symmetric bidder case.
Lemma 1 For the no club (NC) case, given and + 2 ex ante symmetric bidders with private values uniformly distributed in [0, 1], in a second price auction:
1. The expected revenue to the target firm is
which is increasing in .
2. The expected ex ante payoff gross of the entry cost to any bidder is given by
, which is decreasing in .
Proof: See appendix. □ Lemma 1 characterizes the selling firm's revenue when all bidders are symmetric and in the absence of "club" bidder representing two merged bidders. Clearly, as the base number of potential bidders increases, the revenue to the target increases since there are more bidders competing to acquire the target. In the limit the expected revenue to the seller converges to 1, so that all the surplus accrues to the seller. The increase in the number of bidders has the opposite effect on bidder expected profit, which is decreasing in and in the limit converges to 0.
We now turn to the analysis of scenario two with a club bidder. As described above, when bidders 1 and 2 merge to form a club, their combined synergy for the target is
Since is just the sum of two uniformly distributed random variables, it has a triangular distribution (.) given by
Although defined in a piecewise fashion, notice that ( ) is continuous and differentiable at and 1.
We can now state the following, which summarizes the seller's revenue in the presence of a club bidder, assuming there are a total of + 1 bidders. 1. The expected revenue to the target firm is given by
which is increasing in and .
2. The expected (ex ante) payoff , gross of the cost , of an independent bidder is given by
which is decreasing in and .
3. The expected (ex ante) profit Π to the club bidder is given by Π ( , ) = 1 ( + 2) ( + 1) + 6
Moreover, Π (⋅) > (⋅) ∀ , , and Π (⋅) is decreasing in and increasing in .
Proof: See appendix.
□
Lemma 2 demonstrates that, as expected, the revenue to the target firm (i.e., to the seller) and the bidder profits are a function of the efficiency or degree of value creation of the club. Much like the results from Lemma 1, the revenue to the target increases as the number of potential bidders increases, while the bidders' profits, whether independent or part of the club, decreases with .
4 Do target shareholders benefit from club bidding?
Having characterized the equilibrium profits to the bidders as well as the expected revenue to the seller under the two alternatives concerning whether a club forms or not, we can now compare the two cases. Specifically, we are interested in whether shareholders at the target firm benefit from the formation of a club. To answer this question we need to solve for the equilibrium number of independent bidders that choose to enter in each case. Let ( , ) be the equilibrium number of independent bidders if bidders 1 and 2 choose to form a bidding consortium (the club bidding case) and ( , ) be the equilibrium number of bidders if these bidders bid independently. To avoid notational clutter, we supress the dependence of and on ( , ) where the context makes the dependence clear.
Under free entry, an independent bidder should always be willing to enter as long as , ≥ 0 for the no club and the club cases, respectively. At equilibrium, the free entry conditions, ignoring integer constraints, imply
where ( , ) and ( ) are defined in Lemmas 2 and 1, respectively. Equating these two, we can solve for as a function of as
We assume throughout that is low enough that , ≥ 1 for all so that we always have at least some competition. 8
The relationship defined by (1) is an equilibrium condition. Thus, if the entry costs were such that for a given , a number of independent bidders would enter in the joint bidding scenario, then for the same cost (1) specifies the number of independent bidders that would enter in the symmetric bidder scenario.
It is illustrative to examine the relationship between the equilibrium number of bidders and at = 0. In this case, there is no value creation and the only effect is an elimination of a single bidder. Hence, the number of independent bidders that enter in the two cases differs exactly by 1, i.e., = + 1, and we are left in fact with the same total number of bidders whether a club forms or not. For > 0, however, the results are quite different. The following result represents one of the important implications of endogenizing the number of bidders.
Lemma 3 For all > 0 and all > 0, < + 1.
Proof: Fix > 0. First, note that for = 0, it is straightforward to see that = + 1.
Next, note that, since (⋅) is decreasing in (see Lemma 2), we must have that is also decreasing in since it satisfies ( ) = . Since is independent of , this tells us that
The intuition behind this result stems from the fact that the club bidder's value stochastically dominates that of an independent bidder. This means that, ex ante, an independent bidder anticipates he is less likely to have the highest value and thus succeed in acquiring the target firm when a club is present. Moreover, even when he does win he will on average pay a higher price for the target firm. This results in a reduction of the independent bidder's expected profit, and reduces his incentives to enter relative to the case where there is no club. In equilibrium, the number of independent bidders ( ) that enter in the club bidding scenario is strictly less than + 1.
In other words, a wedge forms between the number of bidders in the two cases. As we show below, this wedge has important implications for the effect of a club's formation on target shareholders.
We can now establish the following result concerning the equilibrium revenue of the target firm when a club is present.
Lemma 4 The revenue to the target firm in the club case,
, is strictly decreasing in the efficiency of the club, : < 0.
Proof: See appendix. □ This result is in marked contrast to the findings in Lemma 2, which establishes that the target's revenue is increasing in the club's efficiency, , when the number of bidders is exogenously given.
Here, we show that once the degree of competition, as measured by the number of bidders, is determined in equilibrium, the target's revenue is in fact decreasing in . This occurs for a similar reason as the result Lemma 3: the presence of the club puts the independent bidders at a greater disadvantage than if the club were not present. Moreover, that disadvantage is larger the greater is the club's efficiency, leading yet fewer independent bidders to enter (i.e., ∂ ∂ < 0), reducing competition, and decreasing the revenue to the target firm. We note that an interesting implication of Lemma 4 is that, if a club's formation is inevitable, the target would prefer the club to be as inefficient as possible.
We can now compare the club bidding case against the standard case where all bidders are symmetric. For that, we define Δ ( , , | ) as the difference in the expected revenues to the seller when all bidders are symmetric versus when a club forms. More formally, we have
where ( ) is defined in Lemma 1 and ( , ) is defined in Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 When bidders face a positive cost of bidding , under free entry the seller is strictly worse off with club bidding for all ∈ (0, 1]: Δ ( , , | ) > 0.
Proof: Note that, for = 0, we have that = + 1, so that we have the same number of (symmetric) bidders whether a club forms or not. Therefore, for = 0 we have
We can now use Lemma 4 to establish the result: since ( ) is by definition independent of but ( , ) is strictly decreasing in , we have
A reduction in the cost of entry increases the number of bidders in both the club and the no club scenarios. However, as Proposition 1 illustrates, the wedge between and necessarily becomes wider as the efficiency of the club increases, so much so that the reduction in the number of independent bidders overhelms the value creation effect. In equilibrium, therefore, a club's formation reduces the revenue to target shareholders in all instances in whic the club is efficient and actually creates some value, i.e., for any > 0. This result is surprising because it does not depend on the level of entry costs, the efficiency of the club, or, consequently, on the number of independent bidders in equilibrium.
Limited number of bidders
In the analysis above, we took the number of potential bidders to be unbounded and solved for the equilibrium number of bidders that would choose to participate in both scenarios. For very low values of the cost , this may imply having a very large number of PE firms that are able to bid to acquire the target firm. This can readily be seen by taking the limit as → 0 and observing that , → ∞, implying that the number of bidders we need to satisfy the free entry condition grows unboundedly large as decreases.
In practice, it is quite likely that the number of bidders with expertise in an industry or a specific segment of the market will be limited. Similarly, the total number of potential bidders may be bounded as a result of financial constraints that prevent some firms for bidding for any particular target. In either case, we would expect the limited number of bidders who have expertise or resources to generate expected payoffs larger than the entry costs.
In this section, we analyze settings where the number of bidders is limited not by entry costs but by the availability of expertise and show that the detrimental effect of allowing club bidding does not universally hold. We assume that the maximum potential number of independent bidders that can participate in the bidding process for the target is given by ≥ 1.
As a preliminary step, we first characterize the equilibrium for the case in which the participating number of bidders does not vary accross the two scenarios. This is most easily done by setting the entry cost equal to zero, so that all independent bidders will choose to participate whether a club has formed or not. Thus, + 2 will be the number of symmetric bidders participating in the no-club case, and independent bidders will compete with the club in the club bidding case for a total of + 1 bidders. We can now calculate the difference in expected revenue to the seller by substituting = = in (2). Thus, the difference in the expected revenue to the seller when all bidders are symmetric versus when a club forms is given by,
With a slight abuse of notation we note that whenever Δ ( , , ) > 0, target revenue is higher with + 2 symmetric bidders. For Δ ( , , ) < 0, the target is better off when a club forms, even if the total number of bidders, + 1, is lower. As a preliminary step, also note that an immediate implication of Lemma 2 is that the expected revenue difference, Δ ( , , ) , must be decreasing in . In other words, increases in increase the rent earned by the target seller stemming from the value creation of the club bidder, and therefore make the club case relatively more attractive for the seller.
We can now establish the following result comparing the two cases.
Proposition 2 For = 0, the expected revenue with a club bidder is always lower: Δ ( , , 0 ) > 0 for all ≥ 1. However, for ∀ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a unique valueˆ ( ) such that allowing a club to form increases revenue to the target for all >ˆ ( ). For = 1,ˆ = 1, and this cutoff value increases as gets smaller, becoming arbitrarily large as → 0.
Proof: See appendix. □ Proposition 2 establishes that with sufficient competition, any value-creating club generates higher revenue for the sale of the target firm. There are clearly two effects at work. First, the reduction in the number of bidders, from +2 to +1, reduces competition and therefore decreases the price the target firm can expect to receive. Second, however, the merger between bidders 1 and 2 creates value by allowing them to combine their synergies and further improve efficiencies at the target. This result therefore shows that for sufficiently large, so that there is a relatively large amount of competition already, the second effect -the value creation effect -dominates and the seller's revenue is increased through the value created by a club bidder. However, it also implies that as the degree of value creation decreases, a significantly greater amount of competition is necessary in order for the target firm to benefit from the value being created by the club. For lower values of levels of , the effect through the reduction in competition implied by the formation of the club dominates, and the seller would be better off if no club were to form.
Implications for target firms
The results from the last two sections suggest that whether or not a club's formation benefits shareholders at the target firm depends not only on how costly it is to bid, but also on how many potential bidders there are as well as on how efficient the club is in the sense of how much value it creates. Here, we consider how limitations on the number of potential bidders, , and on bidding costs determine the ultimate benefit to the target of the presence of a club.
Recall that, from Proposition 2, we know that for every > 0 there exists a valueˆ ( ) such that club bidding is better for the target if the base number of independent bidders who participate is greater thanˆ ( ). If <ˆ ( ), then joint bidding will always be bad for the seller. However, if instead >ˆ ( ), we then have three possible cases to consider:
Case I: A small number of potential independent bidders, i.e., ≤ − 1.
Case II: A large number of potential independent bidders, i.e., + 1 ≤ .
Case III: A moderate number of potential independent bidders, i.e., − 1 < < + 1.
Cases I and II are straightforward to analyze, as they represent the two different extremes in the comparison of bidding costs and the number of potential bidders . Case I describes a setting where there are fewer bidders that can potentially bid ( ) than what would be needed to satisfy the free entry condition ( ). Under the maintained assumption that >ˆ ( ), so that club bidding at least has the potential to raise target revenue, it is clear then the club bidding benefits target shareholders in case I (Proposition 2). Moreover, keeping constant, it is straightforward to see that as decreases both and will increase, implying that for sufficiently low we will always be in case I.
Conversely, in case II the maximum number of independent bidders that the market can support even in the no club case, , is less than the total number that have sufficient expertise to consider the acquisition, . From Proposition 1, club bidding will be unambiguously bad for the target in this case. This will always be the relevant situation when the cost is sufficiently large.
The more interesting situation is case III, which arises for intermediate values of the cost . For this case, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 For given , assume that >ˆ ( ). Then, 1) there exists always a value ( ) such that, for all < ( ), the seller's profit is higher with club bidding; and 2) the cutoff cost ( ) is increasing in .
Proof: Fix . As argued above, from Proposition 2, we know that there is a number of bidders, ( ), such that joint bidding is better for the seller for all >ˆ ( ). From the conditions which define and we know that both are monotonically decreasing in , and grow unboundedly large as → 0. Therefore, as decreases, we can always move sufficiently close to that joint bidding is better for the seller.
To show that the cutoff cost ( ) is increasing in , note simply thatˆ ( ) is decreasing in from Proposition 2. □
The first part of the proposition establishes that as long as there is a sufficiently large number of private equity firms that could feasibly put in a bid (i.e., as long as >ˆ ( )), allowing for a club to form and submit a joint bid will increase the seller's revenue when the cost of bidding, , is sufficiently low. This is because, as decreases, the free-entry number of bidders increases, both for the symmetric case as well as for the case with a club bidder. However, since there are only potential bidders, we wind up with the same base number of bidders, , for both of the scenarios, and thus can have joint bidding be optimal for the seller. Put differently, the result establishes that when the cost of bidding is sufficiently low, the primary determinant of the impact of a club's formation is the number of firms that can potentially bid, and the free entry condition plays no role.
In this case, given that is lower than , the independent PE firms obtain positive expected profits in equilibrium.
In Proposition 3 we have analyzed the effect of bidding costs on the seller's profit for a given number of potential bidders. These results allow us to study the effect of club bidding across scenarios or economies where the cost of bidding may vary but where there is a fixed pool of potential bidders. Alternatively, in many instances it is likely that the cost of bidding is determined by the regulatory or institutional environment, and that the major difference is in the ability PE firms have to bid. The number of PE firms that can potentially bid at any given time may vary for a number of reasons, for instance as a result of macroeconomic factors that determines PE firms' access to credit and financial markets. The next proposition analyzes the effect of changes in .
Proposition 4 Fix the cost of bidding , and assume it is sufficiently low that >ˆ ( ). For a given , the seller's profit with club bidding is lower if either <ˆ ( ) or ≥ + 1. The seller's profit with joint bidding is higher for intermediate values of , i.e., forˆ ( ) < < .
Proof: Follows from the definition ofˆ ( ), and . □
The proposition shows that when the number of potential bidders is either very low or very high, shareholders at the target firm are worse off when a club forms between two of the PE firms.
The intuition is similar to that of the previous result. With a very low number of potential bidders, allowing two of them to form a club significantly reduces competition and harms target shareholders.
Conversely, when the number of potential bidders is very large, the primary constraint on bidding is not the number of potential bidders but rather the cost of bidding. In this case, the results stemming from the free entry case apply, and shareholders are again worse off.
The effect of a club's formation, however, is quite different when there is an intermediate number of potential bidders . When is greater than the minimum number of bidders that are necessary in order for a club's presence to benefit target shareholders, the expected revenue to the target has the potential to be higher in the presence of the club. The restriction that be less than , however, is to ensure that the free entry condition is not binding, so that the equilibrium is determined by how many PE firms are actually in a position to submit a bid.
The results from Propositions 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figure 1 . For any given level of club efficiency , the free entry number of bidders in the club case, , is strictly lower than in the case with no club, . As discussed before, this wedge is what makes club bidding worse for the target under free entry. Moreover, as increases, the number of bidders that will choose to enter will be even lower in the club case. However, from Proposition 2 we also know that the threshold valueˆ decreases as increases.
From the figure, it is apparent that, holding the entry cost constant, the benefit of club bidding depends on the availability of bidders, . For belowˆ , club bidding will always be bad for the target. Likewise for greater than , since then the free entry condition will bind. For values of in betweenˆ and , the number of bidders in either case will be the same and club bidding can raise the revenue to the target since there is a sufficient level of competition but the full impact of the reduction in competition across the two scenarios is not felt. A similar argument applies to the case where we treat the number of bidders as fixed and instead consider changes in the entry cost . When the cost of bidding is very low, equilibrium will be determined purely by how many PE firms have the potential to bid. Conversely, when the cost of bidding is high, the free entry number of bidders will be low irrespective of how many PE firms could potentially purchase the target.
These results may help in explaining time variations in PE firm bidding behavior and the premiums obtained by target firms. Over the last few years the number of private equity firms have been steadily increasing. Moreover, until the current crisis the funds under management had also shown significant year over year increases. Both of these factors likely contributed to an increase in the number of potential private equity bidders. Over this short time period, it does not seem likely that the fixed cost of bidding has had a remarkable change. The above proposition predicts that, holding all else constant, as the competitiveness of the market increases (an increase in the number of potential bidders due to industry effects), the benefit of club bidding will initially increase and then decrease, i.e., our model predicts an inverted U-shaped curve for the benefits of club bidding as a function of the number of bidders. This provides a novel empirical prediction based on the trade-off between value creation and competition identified in this paper.
Numerical example
Here we present a simple numerical example that illustrates the results above. Suppose that the cost of bidding is = 1 72 and that the efficiency parameter for the club is = 0.60386. Using the definitions of Δ from (3) and from Lemma 2, we can solve forˆ ( ), the threshold number of PE firms beyond which a club's formation is beneficial to target shareholders. This value can be shown to beˆ ( ) = 2.66.
We can also solve for the free entry number of independent bidders in the club case by equating ( , ) = to obtain = 5. The number of bidders in the case without a club is just obtained from equating = and solving for to obtain = 6.
With this, we can now conclude that, holding costs fixed, if ≤ 2 then allowing a club to form destroys value for the seller simply because there are too few bidders already, so that the competition effect dominates. If ≥ 6, again club bidding is value destroying for the seller, but this time because of the free entry condition: given the cost of bidding, only 5 independent firms will choose to bid when a club forms. For ∈ {3, 4, 5}, the number of independent bidders in both cases is the same since is below the free entry equilibrium values of and . In these cases allowing club bidding increase the seller's revenue.
The incentives to form a club
While throughout we take the issue of the club's formation as exogenous and examine the impact of the possible existence of a club, here we address the question of whether it is even individually rational for firms to form a club. In other words, we ask whether the private equity firms benefit from joining into a club, or whether they would be better off bidding separately. Since in the free entry case any independent bidder makes zero profits, it is trivially true that joining a club is beneficial to the firms in the club. We therefore focus on the case where bidding costs are low and equilibrium is determined by the number of potential bidders .
Lemma 5
The difference in the expected profits of the club and those of two symmetric bidders in the no club case, Π − 2 , is 1. Increasing in .
2. Positive for all if the club is very efficient ( = 1).
3. Negative for all > 1 if the club is very inefficient ( = 0).
4. For all > 1 there exists aˆ ( ) such that forming a club is optimal for >ˆ ( ) .
5. As increases, the profit to a club bidder relative to that of two independent bidders becomes arbitrarily large: For any Δ > 0, there exists Δ such that
Proof: See appendix. □
The incentives of forming a club are best understood by studying the two key effects at play.
First, there is a value creation effect that comes from the synergy of the club members and which depends on the degree of efficiency of the club. Second, there is the loss of a potential competitor.
An increase in efficiency increases the value creation effect and also the dominance of the club. In the limit, when = 1 the club is fully efficient. Moreover, it also benefits from the reduction in competition. On the other hand, if the club is very inefficient, i.e., if = 0, the club loses all benefits of value creation. In this case, individual members of the club would be better off bidding separately, which would significantly increase their chances of having the winning bid and profiting as a result. Putting these two extremes together, Proposition 5 shows that as long as the club is not too inefficient, i.e., >ˆ , club formation is beneficial to the PE firms comprising the club.
To show that even for a small number of bidders the threshold efficiency level is relatively small, we plotˆ ( ) in the figure below. The figure shows that for a wide range of , the number of potential bidders, relatively small levels of efficiency are required for the PE firms to find it beneficial to form a club. 2 > 0 for all > 0. This occurs because of the value creation associated with the club. In general, increases in competition raise the expected price the winner must pay to the target firm, and reduce each bidder's probability of winning. With symmetric and independent bidders, the difference between the value of the winning bidder and that of the next highest bidder shrinks quickly, so that the ex ante profit to a bidder becomes vanishingly small.
In contrast, the club benefits greatly through the value it creates since whenever > 1 the club is guaranteed of having the highest value, but pays only the value of the second highest bidder.
As increases, the value to the second highest bidder converges to 1, but both Pr ( > 1) and 
Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple analysis of the economics of club bidding in the context of private equity consortia. The key premise in our analysis is that, since private equity firms acquire targets in order to try to improve their value, forming a club may allow some of the individual PE firms' strategies for increasing value at the target to be aggregated. Forming a club thus creates additional value, partly offsetting the effect of the reduction of competition which results from the removal of one potential bidder when a club forms. To the best of our knowledge, our setup is unlike other analyses of private or common value of club bidding that rely on information or risk sharing, and delivers unique predictions.
We show that as long as there is sufficient competition among PE firms, forming a club allows some of the value creation to be appropriated by target shareholders, thus benefitting the target as well as the club's members. However, if bidding is costly then club formation reduces the expected revenue received by target shareholders. This occurs because club formation is generally bad for PE firms not part of the club, which reduces further the number of firms willing to bid.
Throughout, we have focused primarily on the effect of the club's formation on target shareholders, and have ignored larger social welfare considerations. We have done this primarily to shed light on the regulatory concern associated with club bidding and its effect on (minority) shareholders.
It is true, however, that the club's formation creates further value and hence may improve social welfare. At the same time, the presence of the club discourages other bidders from entering, thus reducing the likelihood that an independent bidder will have a value that turns out to be high.
Such an analysis would be interesting for subsequent work.
An interesting extension would be to develop a better understanding of what drives the efficiency of the club, in terms of the club's ability to create value. In the context of our model, this would amount to endogenizing the decision to form a club among a subset of the PE firms. One would expect that larger PE firms would find less benefit from forming a club with another large firm, since it is less likely that they will have skills that do not overlap significantly. However, such an analysis would call for the addition of size or different dimensions of skill into the model, and issue that we leave for future research.
Proof of Lemma 1: It is well-known that in a second price auction, the dominant strategy is for each bidder to bid his private valuation = , with the winner paying a price equal to the second highest value among the + 2 bidders. Letting be the second highest of { | ∈ {1, . . . , + 2}}, the distribution function of the variable is given by
The expected revenue to the seller can therefore be calculated as
as desired. This expression is clearly increasing in since +1 +3 < 1. For the second part, let = max { 1 , . . . , +1 }, where is distributed with CDF ( ) = +1 ( ). The expected profit for a bidder with value is given by
Ex ante expected profits are
For + 2 symmetric bidders, ( ) = so that ( ) = +1 . Thus, bidder expected profits are
as desired. □
Proof of Lemma 2:
To calculate the expected revenue with a club bidder, we note that whenever > 1 the value to the club is higher with probability 1 than the value to any of the other bidders, whose value is at most equal to 1. Therefore, for ∈ [1, 1 + ] the club bidder will always win the auction, and pay a price equal to the highest value among the other bidders.
Defining to be equal to max{ | ∈ {1, . . . , }}, the distribution function of is given by
On the other hand, whenever ≤ 1, the club bidder competes with the other firms, with the winning bidder paying the second highest value among all +1 bidders. Given the distribution function (.) for , we have that the distribution function for the second highest bid among bidders whose values are drawn from the distribution and one bidder whose value is drawn from is given by
Substituting for ( | < 1) and ( ), the distribution function for the second highest value conditional on it being less than 1 is then
Denote by ( , ) the expected revenue to the target when a club is present, which clearly depends on the efficiency parameter . This expected revenue is given by
After substituting, it can be shown that ( , ) = 2
as desired. To show that ( , ) is increasing in , we start by differentiating with respect
The sign of this expression is clearly determined by the term in parentheses in the numerator,
We first show that (4) is decreasing in .
Thus, if (4) is positive at = 1 then it is positive for all . Evaluating 4 at = 1 we obtain 6 + 5 + 2 − 2 (3 + +2 (2 − 1)) = ( + 1) > 0, which establishes our result.
For part (2), note that as before the ex ante expected profit is
From the point of an independent bidder ( ) = −1 ( ) ( ) Thus, the ex-ante expected profits of an independent bidder in this case are
as above. To show that is decreasing in ,we take the first derivative of the regular bidder's profit we obtain,
The sign of the above is clearly determined by its numerator. We show below that the numerator is increasing in .
Thus, ∂ ∂ < 0 ∀ if it is negative at = 1. Evaluating (5) at = 1 we obtain
Hence,
Finally, we can show that is decreasing in as follows:
( 6 ln − 12 + 11 ln + 6 2 ln + 3 ln − 3 2 − 11 )
< 0 for all ∈ (0, 1], which establishes the result.
Profit for the club bidder with a value of if ≤ 1 is given by,
Similarly, if > 1 we have,
We calculate the ex ante expected profit as
Substituting the distribution (⋅) specified earlier we can write the ex ante expected profits as
as desired. Taking the derivative of above with respect to we have
We start by calculate ∂ 3 Π ∂ ∂ 2 as follows:
Thus,
is increasing in . Evaluating
Thus, . Note that, since the inequality is strict, and both the seller's as well as the independent bidders' profits are continuous in and , it also implies that the two iso-profit curves can only cross once.
As above, we denote by and ( ) the equilibrim number of bidders for a given and for the no club and the club cases, respectively. For any ≥ 0, consider a slight increase to + . From above we know that, in order to stay on the independent bidder's iso-profit curve (with profits equal to , the entry cost), will go down from ( ) to ( + ). However, because the iso profit curve for the seller's expected profit curve is steeper, will go down more than the amount that would be required to keep the seller's profit constant. Thus,
This establishes the proposition since the argument holds for any arbitrary ≥ 0 and the fact that the iso-profit curves only cross once. □
Proof of Proposition 2:
Note that the the numerator of Δ ( , ), where is the number of bidders (we use rather than here for ease of notation), is ( , ) = − 2 + (4 − 5 ) + 4 − 6 + 2 (3 + (1 − ))
+1
We will show first that
is negative for all ≥ 2. Thus, we have shown that the second derivative is negative at = 2 and is decreasing in . Thus,
Proof of Lemma 5: The first part is a straight forward implication of the fact that Π is increasing in and is independent of . To see the second part, calculate Π at = 1 to obtain, Π ( = 1) = 1 6 7 + 2 + 18 which is strictly positive for all .
To show the last part all we need is the fact that Π − 2 is negative at = 0, positive at = 1 and increasing for all .
To show the last part, note that since Π remains bounded above zero as → ∞, but → 0, the fraction Π 2
grows unboundedly large as → ∞. □
